Our framework posits a spatial model of product differentiation and assumes that data on past purchasing behavior has given firms knowledge regarding the approximate location of each consumer in brand space. Thus, in our model, the ability to target coupons permits firms to discriminate in price according to consumer heterogeneity in brand loyalty. 9 While this opens up a new avenue of competition among firms, it does not preclude the traditional price discrimination that arises with consumer self-selection. Whereas targeting coupons to specific households exploits differences in customer brand loyalty, random coupon distribution coupled with consumer self-selection exploits differences in coupon user/non-user price sensitivity. Both types of price discrimination can coexist.
After controlling for the effects of mass-media coupon distribution, we find that coupon targeting intensifies competition without allowing firms profitably to raise their regular prices. Thus, the outcome of rivalrous coupon targeting is a prisoner's dilemma in which profits are lower for all firms. This supports the contention of some that the net effect of couponing in a competitive environment is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers (Raphel 1988b; and Chiang 1992) . Our results also provide some support for the view that coupons should be directed at a rival's customers for the purpose of increasing brand sales (Neslin and Clarke 1987; .10 This strategy does indeed predominate in equilibrium, if the cost of targeting is high. On the other hand, the model predicts that as the cost of coupon targeting declines over 'Heterogeneity in brand loyalty is the sine qua non of sales promotions in Narasimhan (1988).
"
5 By ascribing a central role to a firm's incremental sales per redemption, these authors implicitly assume that targeting a rival's customers is best provided the cost of such targeting is not too steep.
2 time, relatively more and more defensive targeting will be implemented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II specifies the model and notation.
In section III, we derive equilibrium coupon targeting strategies assuming that firms selectively target coupons to individual consumers. After controlling for the effects of mass-media coupon distribution, section IV considers the impact of competitive coupon targeting on firm profits, prices and coupon face values. Section V examines the incidence of offensive and defensive targeting and section VI derives comparative statics concerning the effect a declining cost of coupon targeting over time has on the incidence of coupon redemption rates, incremental sales per redemption, and the number of coupons distributed. Section VII concludes.
II The Model and Notation
Consider a market in which two firms sell competing brands of a consumer good that is produced at constant marginal cost c. Since heterogeneity in consumer tastes is essential to study coupon targeting, we adopt a spatial model of product differentiation and assume, a la Hotelling (1929) , that consumer tastes differ along a single dimension in product space. For simplicity, we abstract from product design choices by locating firms at opposite ends of the line segment [0, 1] .1
We consider a two-stage game-theoretic model of pricing and coupon distribution. In the initial stage, firms compete for customers by simultaneously and noncooperatively choosing their regular prices (RA, RB) and coupon face values. Once pricing and promotion depth decisions have been made, firms proceed in stage two by distributing coupons according to their targeting strategies (RA, SIB), which specify the probability that consumers on any given interval of the line segment [0, 1] will receive a firm's targeted coupon. Firms may also randomly distribute coupons via the mass-media in stage two. If so, these coupons are assumed to reach all consumers with probability one. We use subgame perfection as our solution concept which means that the actions chosen in "The location of the firms is exogenously specified solely to simplify the exposition. Our qualitative conclusions continue to hold for any symmetric pair of firm locations on [0,1] for which a pure strategy Nash pricing equilibrium exists (see appendix E).
each stage are required to be Nash given the choices in the preceding stages, and the choices in the early stages are chosen knowing the effects of such actions in the stages to follow.
1 "
This two-stage game accentuates the strategic role of firms' coupon targeting decisions by assuming they are made subsequent to decisions on regular prices and coupon face values. From a game theoretic point of view, an implicit assumption is that this two-step decision making sequence corresponds to the relative speed with which these choices are typically altered in practice. Hence, firm pricing and promotion depth decisions are thought of as strategic managerial decisions that are relatively less responsive than perturbations in coupon targeting strategies.
A similar multi-stage sequence is also employed by Rao (1991) in modeling firms' price promotion decisions in a competitive environment. Although he focuses on the frequency of firms' price promotions, whereas we focus on firms' coupon targeting decisions, his multi-stage sequence in which regular prices and promotion discounts are chosen prior to the frequency of promotion is analogous to our set-up. Beyond providing a convenient framework of analysis, however, there is anecdotal evidence, offered by Rao, that some managers do make their price promotion decisions in such a sequence. Ultimately, however, stylized models such as ours should be judged on the usefulness of their insights and the validity of the testable implications they generate.'
3
Consumers and the spatial model framework
We now turn attention to the consumer side of the model. In particular, we posit that consumers differ in their willingness to pay for the two brands. The farther away a consumer's tastes are from the product characteristics of a given brand, the less the consumer is willing to pay. Let V be a common reservation price for each consumer's ideal brand and let i be the transportation cost per unit of distance for a consumer of type i. Then a type i consumer located at X is willing to 12See Moorthy (1985) for his excellent survey on marketing applications using subgame perfection.
"'It is encouraging to note that our analysis is robust to alternative sequences of play in which regular prices and coupon face values are chosen prior to coupon distribution strategies. Unfortunately, we are unable to check the robustness of our results for games in which coupon distribution strategies and coupon face values are chosen simultaneously, since no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists for such games (proof available on request). Moreover, solving for mixed strategy equilibria when the mixing can occur over a continuum of coupon distribution strategies, coupon face values, and possibly regular prices is beyond current game-theoretic techniques.
4 5 pay V -t'X for brand A located at zero, and V -t'(1 -X) for brand B located at one. In order to focus on coupon targeting in a competitive environment, we assume V is sufficiently large that within the relevant range of prices, all consumers will make a purchase.
Consumers also differ in their willingness to redeem coupons. A fraction a of consumers incur no costs of coupon usage. Anyone in this group who receives a firm's coupon will redeem it if she purchases from the firm. To simplify the exposition, these consumers will henceforth be known as C-Users. Coupon usage for everyone else is prohibitively costly. These consumers will henceforth be known as Non-Users. Following convention, we assume that C-Users as a group are weakly more price-sensitive than Non-Users. In our spatial framework, this means that t*, the transportation cost for C-Users, is less than or equal to in, the transportation cost for Non-Users.
The marginal consumer among Non-Users is defined as the consumer who is just indifferent
between buying from either one of the two firms given (RA, RB). Algebraically, the location of such a consumer must satisfy RA + t"X = RB + t"(1 -X). Solving yields
All Non-Users who are located to the left of X will buy from firm A, while all Non-Users located to the right of X will buy from firm B. Note that in the event both firms have equal regular prices, X = 1/2, and Non-Users simply buy whichever brand is closer to their specific tastes.
Of even more interest is the purchasing behavior of the C-Users. Define Pi as the price C-Users must pay to purchase firm i's product if they do not have its targeted coupon. In the event firm i does not also randomly distribute coupons via the mass-media, this price is the same as firm i's regular price. Otherwise, PI, is interpreted as firm i's regular price minus the face value of its massmedia coupons, which all C-Users receive. Under either interpretation, the marginal consumer in the set of C-Users who do not receive a targeted coupon is located at -
PB -PA+te 2tc
Those in the set who are located to the left of X will buy from firm A, while those in the set who are located to the right of X will buy from firm B. At equal prices, consumers in this group buy whichever brand is closer to them in product space. will buy brand A. There is no need for firm A ever to target these consumers. Intuitively, in the event PB = PA, XA > 0 requires dB < t , which means that the discount offered by firm B falls short of the disutility these consumers would incur if they were to purchase brand B.
Similarly, consumers with strong preferences for brand B will prefer buying from firm B even will buy brand B. There is no need for firm B ever to target these consumers. As above, the intuition is most easily seen in the symmetric case where PA = PB. Note that in this case, XB 1 requires that dA t .
The remaining C-Users might potentially be induced to switch brands as a consequence of 
III Competitive Coupon Targeting
In this section, we derive the stage-two equilibrium targeting strategies for each firm after controlling for possible mass-media distribution. In practice, the targeting information available to firms comes from historical data on household purchasing behavior as well as from information gleaned from market surveys." For instance, Rossi and Allenby (1993) report on a scanner panel dataset which consists of observations on individual household purchases of tuna dating back two and a half years. Using newly developed statistical procedures, they show how the data can be used to rank households according to brand preference and price sensitivity. In our model, we abstract from data estimation problems and simplify by assuming firms can perfectly distinguish between C-Users with different purchasing behaviors.
Assuming a constant marginal cost of coupon targeting, z, neither firm will ever target coupons to the set of Non-Users, since these consumers do not redeem coupons, and neither firm will ever target coupons to the set of C-Users in regions I and V, since these consumers cannot be induced to switch brands given each firm's discount. The rest of the C-Users, however, are potential brand switchers. These are the consumers over whom rivalry in targeted coupon promotion will occur.
Consider first a representative C-User in region II. This consumer will only buy from firm B if she receives B's targeted coupon and does not receive A's targeted coupon. Otherwise, she will buy from firm A. Whether or not firm A wants to target a coupon to this consumer depends upon "Catalina Marketing, Citicorp P.O.S. Information Services, and Advanced Promotion Technologies have been working with retailers on developing electronic couponing, whereby manufacturers' coupons can be targeted to consumers at the point of sale based on their past purchasing behavior. The long range goal of these firms is to jump from the testing stage of gathering data to the implementation of widescale target couponing programs. With the advent of electronic couponing, increasingly complex targeting strategies will become feasible as the technology improves and information on household purchasing behavior accumulates. 
are the respective probabilities that firms A and B target coupons in region 11. 15
Firm A prefers not to target coupons to C-Users in this region, since they are already predisposed to buy from A. Nonetheless, it practices defensive couponing because otherwise firm B would target coupons to them with probability one. Firm B is aggressive in this region. At a marginal cost z for every coupon delivered, it takes a chance on being able to attract new customers. On balance, however, firm B succeeds in attracting brand switchers only with probability o,(1 -a), since its offensive couponing is tempered somewhat by firm A's defensive couponing strategy.
Intuitively, the probability that firm A targets coupons to C-Users in region II is positively related to firm B's net per unit markup, since the higher is firm B's markup, the more tempting it is for firm B to target coupons, and hence the more defensive couponing firm A must do to retain its customers. The probability that firm B targets coupons in this region is positively related both to the marginal cost of couponing and to firm A's targeted coupon face value. The more firm A's cost of defending its customers increases, the more tempting it is for firm A to forego targeting, and hence the more attractive is firm B's offensive couponing. Notice it is possible for C-Users in "There are two distinct ways to interpret each firm's mixed strategy. One can think of firm i's mixing in region II as an all or nothing coupon drop that occurs with probability o,(C 1) or does not occur with probability (1 -o;(C; I) ).
Alternatively , Vgy PA -dA-C-z°A 
eT~, PB -c PA-dA-c are the respective probabilities that firms A and B target coupons in region IV. Analogous to region II, firm B would prefer not to target coupons to C-Users in this region. Nonetheless, it does so to mitigate the effectiveness of firm A's offensive couponing. On balance, firm A succeeds in attracting brand switchers only with probability &A(1 -dB).
It is easy to verify that firm A (B) always (never) targets coupons to C-Users in region III.

Intuitively, these consumers will buy from firm A if and only if they have A's targeted coupon;
hence, it is not surprising that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this region.
To summarize, each firm's equilibrium coupon targeting strategy for a given region r in brand space is as follows:
'Given the static nature of the model, only one coupon can be redeemed per consumer even in the event a consumer receives two. One might ask how the analysis would change in a dynamic model if, instead of throwing the second coupon away, a consumer were to retain it until her next purchase occasion. Assuming the second coupon will not have reached its expiration date, such a consumer would then prefer buying from the other firm, say firm B, in the next period, all else being equal. However, knowing that its potential brand switchers already have B's targeted coupon for use the next period, firm A will no longer be indifferent to sending these consumers a coupon for its brand. The net result is that firm A will target coupons to consumers in this region with probability one and they will once again buy brand A on their next purchase occasion. The original targeted coupon for brand B is saved and the cycle is repeated for as long as firm B's coupon is valid. A symmetric argument applies to C-Users in region IV. Given that firms A and B in the static model are indifferent to sending coupons to C-Users in regions II and IV (property of the mixed strategy equilibrium), firm A's (B's) expected profit in equilibrium from each C-User in region II (IV) is the same as if it sent coupons to them with probability one. Hence, it is straightforward to show that modifying the game to allow for multiple periods, while altering coupon targeting strategies for period 2 onward such that firm A (B) targets with probability one (sero) in region II and firm B (A) targets with probability one (zero) in region IV, does not affect firm profits, prices, or coupon face values as calculated in the next section. binary groups by reservation prices, he finds that for any given number of firms, third-degree price discrimination always leads to higher profits. Holmes (1989) considers a symmetric duopoly model with general demand. In his model, consumers are exogenously partitioned into two groups, which he calls the weak and strong markets. He also finds that profits always rise with third-degree price discrimination when market demand is held constant.
A(r)
"' In their survey chapter on coupons, Blattberg and Neslin (1990:271,272 ) summarize this view as follows: "The Our analysis proceeds by examining these views in the context of two scenarios. In the first (second) scenario, we consider the competitive effects of coupon targeting in the absence (presence) of mass-media distribution. In doing so, we isolate the effects of targeted couponing after controlling for the standard consumer self-selection story with mass-media distributed coupons.
Assume initially that the cost of distributing coupons via the mass-media is prohibitive and focus exclusively on market segmentation induced by targeted couponing. In this case, Pi = Ri, and interpreting it as a weighted average of the transportation costs of C-Users and Non-Users. It is easily verified that t* < tw <t". given to the second scenario (figure 4). This will enable us to economize on the exposition as many of the insights are robust across the two situations.
We now proceed to consider the polar case in which distributing coupons via the mass-media is costless. In this case, P is interpreted as firm i's regular price minus the face value of its massmedia coupon, and d; is interpreted as the amount by which firm i's targeted coupon face value exceeds firm i's mass-media coupon face value. Each firm's problem in stage one is now modified by replacing the constraint P, = R; with R; > P;. Thus, firm i's problem is to choose (R 1 , P;, d,) to maximize I; such that R, > P, and d; > 0. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium, given in figure 4 below, is derived in appendix C. In equilibrium, some of the targeting is designed to keep one's own potential brand switchers (defensive) and some of the targeting is designed to steal the rival's potential brand switchers (offensive). As a result, the division of the market becomes blurred. Each firm lures away a fraction of the rival's brand switchers with the net effect being to increase the area of competition 2 2
One can also think of the transportation cost parameter as a measure of product differentiation in the market since at t = 0 the products are perfect substitutes and as t increases the products become less substitutable. To summarize, both coupon targeting and mass-media coupon distribution can coexist. The latter is associated with higher regular prices and is profitable for the firms; the former simply increases competition for the potential brand switchers and is deleterious to firm profits.
Proposition 3 Coupon targeting in a competitive environment gives rise to a prisoner's dilemma
in which profits are lower for both firms.
Since coupon targeting is very effective in stealing a rival's potential brand switchers and keeping one's own, each firm stands to gain by availing itself of the targeting technology regardless of its
2' 4 Formally, one can think of (RA, RB) as jointly determining X and (PA, PB) as jointly determining X. These boundary points of marginal consumers separate firm A's customers from firm B's customers in the absence of targeted coupon distribution. But they also serve the same role when coupons are targeted since, in equilibrium, dA = dB and therefore Xs = X = X. Thus, the change in profit from a small change in price to those who do not redeem targeted coupons is identical with or without targeted coupon distribution. In equilibrium, regular prices and mass-media coupon face values are necessarily the same. asThe endogeneity of market segmentation is critical in constraining firms from raising their regular prices when coupons are targeted. In contrast, Narasimhan (1988), who considers a duopoly model in which consumers are either captive brand loyal and not price-sensitive at all, or brand switchers and willing to shop around, finds that when firms distribute coupons (redeemed only by brand switchers), prices rise to the non-coupon users (captive loyal customers). Market segmentation is not endogenous in his setting, however, because the number of captive brand loyal customers is assumed fixed.
rival's strategy. But firms are caught in a prisoner's dilemma. Although some consumers are induced to switch brands, expected market shares do not change. And since regular prices do not rise with the introduction of targeting, the net effect of this form of couponing in a competitive environment is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers.
We now consider how coupon face values and the loss in profit with targeting vary with massmedia distribution, average consumer brand loyalty, and the marginal cost of coupon targeting.
Turning to the fourth column in figures 3 and 4, titled Profit, and comparing rows 1 and 2, the change in profit with the introduction of coupon targeting is given by
where k = w in the absence of mass-media distribution and k = c in the presence of mass-media distribution. Since t' > t , the loss in profit from the introduction of coupon targeting is weakly greater in the absence of mass-media distribution. The reason is that the additional discount given to C-Users in regions II and IV when they already have a mass-media coupon, i.e. (te -z)/2 from the second column under the heading Promotion Decisions in figure 4 , is less than the targeted discount they would receive if there were no mass-media coupon, i.e. (t" -z)/2 from figure 3.
Intuitively, the size of di endogenously determines the set of potential brand switchers. In particular, d; determines the number of firm i's potential brand switchers. Although each firm tries to steal its rival's customers, its expected profit from doing so is zero. Instead, firms earn positive expected profit from their defensive targeting. From firm i's perspective, the marginal profit of a customer who is prevented from switching to firm j is tk -z -dg. Since the interval of firm i's potential brand switchers is d,/2t, firm i will choose di to maximize (tk -z -di)d;/2t. This yields di = (tk -z)/2. Notice that di is proportional to the marginal profit from retaining a C-User, which means it is increasing in average consumer brand loyalty. Not surprisingly, higher coupon face values are needed to induce switching as the brands become more differentiated.
When coupons are not also distributed via the mass-media, di is interpreted as the actual 
Brand loyalty
Cost of couponing
Face Value Number Distributed Redemption Rate Incremental Sales
One might think that the incidence of targeting should be decreasing in average consumer brand loyalty, since inducing additional consumers to switch brands would become increasingly more expensive. Yet this factor is more than offset by the increasingly attractive per-unit pricecost markup; although the size of the discount needed to induce consumers to switch is increasing in average consumer brand loyalty, the regular prices that firms charge are increasing even more.
As the incidence of targeting increases, however, consumers with multiple targeted coupons become more frequent and hence redemption rates fall. Incremental sales per redemption also fall as firms shift more toward defending their market share.
A similar pattern holds as the cost of coupon targeting falls. Firms adjust on the margin by increasing their coupon face value, though by less than the decrease in z, and taking advantage of the decrease in the cost of attracting brand switchers by increasing their incidence of targeting.
Redemption rates and incremental sales per redemption fall for the same reason as above.
Proposition 7 Targeted coupon face values will increase, more targeted coupons will be distributed, targeted coupon redemption rates will decrease, and fewer redemptions will be incremental over time as the cost of coupon targeting falls.
Propositions 6 and 7 predict a negative association between targeted coupon face values and targeted coupon redemption rates, and between targeted coupon face values and targeted incremental sales per redemption, over time and across industries with varying consumer brand loyalty.
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At first blush, these predictions appear to be at odds with some established empirical literature which suggests the opposite is true. Based on observations from actual coupon drops, Reibstein and Traver (1982) and Ward and Davis (1978) find that higher coupon face values are associated with higher coupon redemption rates. Similarly, Klein (1985) and Shoemaker and Tibrewala (1985) find a positive relationship between coupon face values and incremental sales. In fact, these studies are demonstrating a functional relationship between two variables while holding other factors constant, whereas our predictions are based on equilibrium comparisons in which all factors vary simultaneously. To illustrate the difference in methods, and why there need be no contradiction, our predictions are fully consistent with the trend during the 1980's in which coupon face values increased in excess of the inflation rate while average coupon redemption rates uniformly declined.
VII Conclusion
Our primary objective in this article has been to provide an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of the new forms of coupon targeting in which promotion discounts can be directed at brand switchers. In the process, we have compared and contrasted rivalry in price discrimination which leads to exogenous market segmentation, such as random coupon distribution coupled with consumer self-selection, with rivalry in price discrimination which leads to endogenous market segmentation, such as the new forms of coupon targeting. Our main result, after controlling for mass-media distribution, is that when coupons can be directed at brand switchers, the outcome is a prisoner's dilemma in which firms necessarily lose profit because regular prices do not increase.
We also derive managerial implications concerning the optimal mix of offensive and defensive targeting as well as several testable implications concerning the effects of coupon targeting on massmedia and targeted coupon face values, coupon redemption rates, incremental sales per redemption, 25 A similar apparent paradox and resolution apply to the relationship between redemption rates and incremental sales. Intuition suggests a negative functional relationship between R and I, since pure defensive targeting would achieve a 100% redemption rate but garner relatively few incremental sales, and a pure offensive targeting strategy would achieve a 100% incremental sales per redemption but have a low redemption rate. 
(6)
(8)
ABdB =0, AB >0, dB >0.
where the left hand side of equation (1) 
It is easily verified that the second order conditions for constrained optimization are satisfied. Case 2: AA = aB = 0 (Targeting): Solving equations (3), (4), (6), and (7) by setting AA = AB = 0, we have RA = RB = PA = PB = ' + c, and dA = dB = (t* -z)/2. Equations (5) and (8) imply i* > z. Given t* > t"/2, XA > 0 and XB < 1 are indeed satisfied.
Case 3: AA > 0 and AB = 0: In this case, JA = 0. Solving equations (3), (6) and (7) gives:
However, dB > 0 implies i" > z and AA > 0 implies, by equation (4), t' < z. A contradiction.
Case 4: AA = 0 and AB > 0: This case is symmetric to case 3.
Thus, if a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which XA > 0 and XB < 1, it is uniquely defined by cases 1 and 2 for the given parameter values therein.
Part 3: We now establish that the solution identified above is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is accomplished by showing that neither firm can profitably deviate. In particular, it must be that firm A (B) cannot profitably deviate such that XA < 0 (XB 2 1). It is straightforward, albeit arduous, to show that, for t > t"/2, the unique solution requires XA = 0 and no other constraints bind. However, at the candidate equilibrium, firm A can profitably deviate so that XA > 0. The case where XA 2 0 and XB > 1 is symmetric. Thus, it can be concluded that no asymmetric subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
We can similarly show that no subgame perfect equilibrium exists where XA 0 and Xy 2 1.
Since the proof is analogous, we spare readers the details. This completes our proof that, for t° > t"/2, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is defined in cases 1 and 2.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we derive the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the presence of mass-media coupons. Our derivation consists of four parts. In part 1, we characterize the necessary conditions for existence of an equilibrium in which XA > 0 and XB < 1. In part 2, we solve these necessary conditions and thereby identify a candidate equilibrium. In part 3, we show that neither firm can profitably deviate and hence establish that the solution identified in part 2 is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. In part 4, we demonstrate uniqueness by proving there exists no other subgame perfect equilibrium.
Part 1: In the presence of mass-media coupons, firm i chooses R;, P and d, to maximize I; such that R; > P, and d; > 0, taking its rival's choices as given. We can simplify the analysis considerably by observing that for t" > t*, the first constraint never binds for firm i. Incorporating this observation, the Lagrange function is again given by G; = 1 + Aid,. Any subgame perfect equilibrium in which XA > 0 and XB < 1 can now be characterized by the following necessary first order conditions derived from each firm's constrained optimization: This means that equilibrium firm profits necessarily decrease in the neighborhood of z for which coupon targeting just emerges in equilibrium.
{a1 -F(Xs) -(RB -c)f(Xs)OX -(dB + z)(f(X l)i-f(Xs)-XS) +
Appendix E
In this appendix, we show the robustness of our results to any pair of symmetric firm locations, a and b, for which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists with C-Users in all five regions. 27 Since the proof for the case with mass-media couponing is analogous to the case without mass-media couponing, we focus exclusively on the latter and leave details of the other to the reader. Note that whenever there are equilibria with C-Users in all five regions, the definitions of XA, XB, and Xs are unaffected by the fact that the two firms are now located away from the two ends.
Since XA > a and XB < & in any such equilibria, firms' targeting strategies and payoff functions also remain unchanged. Therefore, the necessary conditions characterizing such an equilibrium are the same as if the two firms located at both ends and, consequently, so is the candidate equilibrium. Now, we need only to show that such an equilibrium indeed exists, given that the two firms are located symmetrically away from the two ends.
Consider, without loss of generality, firm A's possible deviations. Given AB = i* + c and da = (tW -z)/2, firm A can either deviate by choosing (RA,dA) such that it has no C-Users in region I or it can deviate by choosing (RA, dA) such that it captures all of firm B's C-Users. In the former case, the optimal deviation for firm A is given by: Straightforward calculations show it is never profitable for firm A to take the first path. In the latter case, the profitability of firm A's deviation is decreasing in b. At 6 = 2, it can be shown that firm A cannot profitably deviate. Since firm B's deviation is symmetric, we conclude that, for & > 9 and a < 4, the subgame perfect equilibrium exists as stated in figure 3 in the text. 
